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Abstract. We present a systematic study of the transferability of ad-
versarial attacks on state-of-the-art object detection frameworks. Using
standard detection datasets, we train patterns that suppress the ob-
jectness scores produced by a range of commonly used detectors, and
ensembles of detectors. Through extensive experiments, we benchmark
the effectiveness of adversarially trained patches under both white-box
and black-box settings, and quantify transferability of attacks between
datasets, object classes, and detector models. Finally, we present a de-
tailed study of physical world attacks using printed posters and wearable
clothes, and rigorously quantify the performance of such attacks with dif-
ferent metrics.
Fig. 1: In this demonstration, the YOLOv2 detector is evaded using a pattern
trained on the COCO dataset with a carefully constructed objective.
1 Introduction
Adversarial examples are security vulnerabilities of machine learning systems in
which an attacker makes small or unnoticeable perturbations to system inputs
with the goal of manipulating system outputs. These attacks are most effec-
tive in the digital world, where attackers can directly manipulate image pixels.
However, many studies assume a white box threat model, in which the attacker
knows the dataset, architecture, and model parameters used by the victim. In
addition, most attacks have real security implications only when they cross into
the physical realm.
In a “physical” attack, the adversary modifies a real-world object, rather
than a digital image, so that it confuses systems that observe it. These objects
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must maintain their adversarial effects when observed with different cameras,
resolutions, lighting conditions, distances, and angles.
While a range of physical attacks have been proposed in the literature,
these attacks are frequently confined to digital simulations, or are demonstrated
against simple classifiers rather than object detectors. However, in most realistic
situations the attacker has only black or grey box knowledge, and their attack
must transfer from the digital world into the physical world, from the attacker
model to the victim model, or from models trained on one dataset to another.
In this paper, we study the transferability of attacks on object detectors
across different architectures, classes, and datasets, with the ultimate goal of
generalizing digital attacks to the real-world. Our study has the following goals:
– We focus on industrial-strength detectors under both black-box and white-
box settings. Unlike classifiers, which output one feature vector per image,
object detectors output a map of vectors, one for each prior (i.e., candi-
date bounding box), centered at each output pixel. Since any of these priors
can detect an object, attacks must simultaneously manipulate hundreds or
thousands of priors operating at different positions, scales, and aspect ratios.
– In the digital setting, we systematically quantify how well attacks on detec-
tors transfer between models, classes and datasets.
– We break down the incremental process of getting attacks out of a digital
simulation and into the real world. We explore how real-world nuisance vari-
ables cause major differences between the digital and physical performance of
attacks, and present experiments for quantifying and identifying the sources
of these differences.
– We quantify the success rate of attacks under various conditions, and measure
how algorithm and model choices impact success rates. We rigorously study
how attacks degrade classifiers using standard metrics (average precision)
that best describe the strength of detectors, and also more interpretable
success/failure metrics.
– We push physical attacks to their limits with wearable adversarial clothing,
and quantify the success rate of our attacks under complex fabric distortions.
2 Related Work
Attacks on object detection and semantic segmentation. While there is a
plethora of work on attacking image classifiers [25,11,23], less work has been done
on more complex vision tasks like object detection and semantic segmentation.
Metzen et al. demonstrate that nearly imperceptible adversarial perturbations
can fool segmentation models to produce incorrect outputs [24]. Arnab et al.
also show that segmentation models are vulnerable to attacks [1], and claim
that adversarial perturbations fail to transfer across network architectures. Xie
et al. introduce Dense Adversary Generation (DAG), a method that produces
incorrect predictions for pixels in segmentation models or proposals in object
detection frameworks [34]. Wei et al. further extend the attack from images to
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videos [33]. In contrast to [34,33], which Attacks the classifier stage of object
detectors, Li et al. attack region proposal networks by decreasing the confidence
scores of positive proposals [19]. DPatch causes misclassification of detectors, by
placing a patch that does not overlap with the objects of interest [22]. Li et al.
add imperceptible patches to the background to fool object detectors [18]. Note
that all of these studies focus on digital (as opposed to physical) attacks with a
specific detector, without studying the transferability of attacks. In this paper,
we systematically evaluate a wide range of popular detectors in both the digital
and physical world, and benchmark how attacks transfer in different settings.
Physical attacks in the real world. Kurakin et al. took photos of adversar-
ial images with a camera and input them to a pretrained classifier [16]; they
demonstrate that a large fraction of images are misclassified. Eykholt et al. con-
sider physical attacks on stop sign classifiers using images cropped from video
frames [9]. They successfully fool classifiers using both norm bounded perturba-
tions, and also sparse perturbations using carefully placed stickers. Stop signs
attacks on object detectors are considered in [8,5]. Lu et al. showed that the per-
turbed sign images from [9] can be reliably recognized by popular detectors like
Faster-RCNN [27] and Yolov2 [26], and showed that detectors are much more ro-
bust to attacks than classifiers. Note that fooling stop sign detectors differs from
fooling person detectors because stop sign perturbations can cover the whole
object, whereas our person attacks leave the face, hands, and legs uncovered.
Zeng et al. use rendering tools to perform attacks in 3D environments [37].
Sitawarin et al. [30] propose large out-of-distribution perturbations, producing
toxic signs to deceive autonomous vehicles. Athalye et al. introduce expectation
over transformations (EoT) to generate physically robust adversarial samples,
and they produce 3D physical adversarial objects that can attack classifiers in
different conditions. Sharif et al. explore adversarial eyeglass frames that fool
face classifiers [28]. Brown et al. placed adversarial patches [3] on raw images,
forcing classifiers to output incorrect predictions. Komkov et al. generate stick-
ers attached to hats to attack face classifiers [15]. Huang et al. craft attacks
by simulations to cause misclassification of detectors [14]. Thys et al. produce
printed adversarial patches [31] that deceive person detectors instantiated by
Yolov2 [26]. This proof-of-concept study was the first to consider physical at-
tacks on detectors, although it was restricted to the white-box setting. Fur-
thermore the authors did not quantify the performance, or address issues like
robustness to distance/distortions and detectors beyond Yolov2, and the trans-
ferability of their attacks are limited. Xu et al. learn TPS transformations to
generate T-shirts [36]. To the best of our knowledge, no paper has conclusively
demonstrated the transferability of attacks on object detectors, or quantified the
reliability of transfer attacks.
2.1 Object detector basics
We briefly review the inner workings of object detectors [20,4,29,17], most of
which can be described as two-stage frameworks (e.g., Fast(er) RCNN [10,27],
Mask RCNN [12], etc.) or one-stage pipelines (e.g., YOLOv2 [26], SSD [21], etc.).
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Two-stage detectors. These detectors use a region proposal network (RPN)
to identify potential bounding boxes (Stage I), and then classify the contents of
these bounding boxes (Stage II). An RPN passes an image through a backbone
network to produce a stack of 2D feature maps with resolution W ′ × H ′ (or a
feature pyramid containing features at different resolutions). The RPN considers
k “priors”, or candidate bounding boxes with a range of aspect ratios and sizes,
centered on every output pixel. For each of the W ′ × H ′ × k priors, the RPN
produces an “objectness score”, and also the offset to the center coordinates and
dimensions of the prior to best fit the closest object. Finally, proposals with high
objectness scores are sent to a Stage-II network for classification.
One-stage detectors. These networks generate object proposals and at the
same time predict their class labels. Similar as RPNs, these networks typically
transform an image into a W ′ ×H ′ feature map, and each pixel on the output
contains the locations of a set of default bounding boxes, their class prediction
scores, as well as objectness scores.
Why are detectors hard to fool? A detector usually produces hundreds or
thousands of priors that overlap with an object. Usually, non-maximum supres-
sion (NMS) is used to select the bounding box with highest confidence, and reject
overlapping boxes of lower confidence so that an object is only detected once.
Suppose an adversarial attack evades detection by one prior. In this case, the
NMS will simply select a different prior to represent the object. For an object
to be completely erased from an image, the attack must simultaneously fool the
ensemble of all priors that overlap with the object—a much harder task than
fooling the output of a single classifier.
Detection metrics. In the field of object detection, the standard performance
metric is average precision (AP) per class, which balances the trade-off between
precision and recall. In contrast, success rates (using a fixed detection threshold)
are more often used when evaluating physical attacks, due to their interpretabil-
ity. However, manually selected thresholds are required to compute success rates.
To mitigate this issue, we report both AP (averaging over all confidence thresh-
olds) and success rates.
3 Approach
Our goal is to generate an adversarial pattern that, when placed over an object
either digitally or physically, makes that object invisible to detectors. Further,
we expect the pattern to be (1) universal (image-agnostic)—the pattern must be
effective against a range of objects and within different scenes; (2) transferable—
it breaks a variety of detectors with different backbone networks; (3) dataset
agnostic—it should fool detectors trained on disparate datasets; (4) robust to
viewing conditions—it can withstand field-of-view changes when observed from
different perspectives and distances; (5) realizable—patterns should remain ad-
versarial when printed over real-world 3D objects.
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Rendering function
Image Patch
Fig. 2: An overview of the framework. Given a patch and an image, the
rendering function uses translations and scalings, plus random augmentations, to
overlay the patch onto detected persons. The patch is then updated to minimize
the objectness scores produced by a detector while maintaining its smoothness.
3.1 Creating a universal adversarial patch
Our strategy is to “train” a patch using a large set of images containing people.
On each iteration, we draw a random batch of images, and pass them through
an object detector to obtain bounding boxes containing people. We then place
a randomly transformed patch over each detected person, and update the patch
pixels to minimize the objectness scores in the output feature map.
More formally, we consider a patch P ∈ Rw×h×3 and a randomized rendering
function Rθ. The rendering function takes a patch P and image I, and renders
a rescaled copy of P over every detected person in the image I. In addition
to scaling and translating the patch to place it into each bounding box, the
rendering function also applies an augmentation transform parameterized by
the (random) vector θ.
These transforms are a composition of brightness, contrast, rotation, transla-
tion, and sheering transforms that help make patches robust to variations caused
by lighting and viewing angle that occur in the real world. We also consider more
complex thin-plate-spline (TPS) transforms to simulate the random “crumpling”
of fabrics.
A detector network takes a patched image Rθ(I, P ) as its input, and outputs
a vector of objectness scores, S(Rθ(I, P )) one for each prior. These scores rank
general objectness for a two-stage detector, and the strength of the “person” class
for a one-stage detectors. A positive score is taken to mean that an object/person
overlaps with the corresponding prior, while a negative score denotes the absence
of a person. To minimize objectness scores, we use the objectness loss function
Lobj(P ) = Eθ,I
∑
i
max{Si(Rθ(I, P )) + 1, 0}2. (1)
Here, i indexes the priors produced by the detector’s score mapping. The loss
function penalizes any objectness score greater than −1. This suppresses scores
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that are positive, or lie very close to zero, without wasting the “capacity” of
the patch on decreasing scores that are already far below the standard detection
threshold. We minimize the expectation over the transform vector θ as in [2] to
promote robustness to real-world distortions, and also the expectation over the
random image I drawn from the training set.
Finally, we add a small total-variation penalty to the patch. We do this
because there are pixels in the patch that are almost never used by the ren-
dering function Rθ, which down-samples the high-resolution patch (using linear
interpolation) when rendering it onto the image. A small TV penalty ensures a
smooth patch in which all pixels in the patch get optimized. A comparison to
results without this TV penalty is shown in the supplementary material. The
final optimization problem we solve is
minimize
P
Lobj(P ) + γ · TV (P ), (2)
where γ was chosen to be small enough to prevent outlier pixels without visibly
distorting the patch.
Ensemble training. To help adversarial patterns generalize to detectors that
were not used for training (i.e., to create a black-box attack), we also consider
training patches that fool an ensemble of detectors. In this case we replace the
objectness loss (1) with the ensemble loss
Lens(P ) = Eθ,I
∑
i,j
max{S(j)i (Rθ(I, P )) + 1, 0}2, (3)
where S(j) denotes the jth detector in an ensemble.
4 Crafting attacks in the digital world
Datasets and metrics. We craft attack patches using the COCO dataset,1
which contains a total of 123,000 images. After removing images from the dataset
that do not contain people, we then chose a random subset of 10, 000 images for
training. We compute average precision (AP) for the category of interest to
measure the effectiveness of patches.
Object detectors attacked. We experiment with both one-stage detectors,
i.e., YOLOv2 and YOLOv3, and two-stage detectors, i.e., R50-C4 and R50-
FPN, both of which are based on Faster RCNN with a ResNet-50 [13] backbone.
R50-C4 and R50-FPN use different features for region proposal—R50-C4 uses
single-resolution features, while R50-FPN uses a multi-scale feature pyramid.
For all these detectors, we adopt standard models pre-trained on COCO, in
addition to our own models retrained from scratch (models denoted with “-r”)
to test for attack transferability across network weights. Finally, we consider
patches crafted using three different ensembles of detectors—Ens2: YOLOv2 +
R50-FPN, Ens2-r: YOLOv2 + R50-FPN-r, and Ens3-r: YOLOv2 + YOLOv3
+ R50-FPN-r.
1 We focus on the COCO dataset for its wide diversity of scenes, although we consider
the effect of the dataset later.
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Patch
Victim
R50-C4 R50-C4-r R50-FPN R50-FPN-r YOLOv2 YOLOv2-r YOLOv3 YOLOv3-r
R50-C4 24.5 24.5 31.4 31.4 37.9 42.6 57.6 48.3
R50-C4-r 25.4 23.9 30.6 30.2 37.7 42.1 57.5 47.4
R50-FPN 20.9 21.1 23.5 19.6 22.6 12.9 40.2 40.3
R50-FPN-r 21.5 21.7 25.4 18.8 17.6 11.2 37.5 36.9
Yolov2 21.1 19 21.5 21.4 10.7 7.5 18.1 25.7
Yolov3 28.3 28.9 31.5 27.2 20 15.9 17.8 36.1
Fted 25.6 23.9 24.2 24.4 18.9 16.4 31.6 28.2
Ens2 20 20.3 23.2 19.3 17.5 11.3 39 38.8
Ens2-r 19.7 20.2 23.3 16.8 14.9 9.7 36.3 34.1
Ens3-r 21.1 21.4 24.2 17.4 13.4 9.0 29.8 33.6
Seurat 47.9 52 51.6 52.5 43.4 39.5 62.6 57.1
Random 53 58.2 59.8 59.7 52 52.5 70 63.5
Grey 45.9 49.6 50 50.8 48 47.1 65.6 57.5
Grey++ 46.5 49.8 51.4 52.7 48.5 49.4 64.8 58.6
Clean 78.7 78.7 82.2 82.1 63.6 62.7 81.6 74.5
Table 1: Impact of different patches on various detectors, measured
using average precision (AP). The left axis lists patches created by different
methods, and the top axis lists different victim detectors. Here, “r” denotes
retrained weights instead of pretrained weights downloaded from model zoos.
Implementation details. We use PyTorch for implementation, and we start
with a random uniform patch of size 3 × 250 × 150 (the patch is dynamically
re-sized by Rθ during the forward pass). We use the size since the aspect ratio is
similar to that of a body trunk and it has sufficient capacity to reduce objectness
scores. We use the Adam optimizer with a learning rate 10−3, and decay the rate
every 100 epochs until 400 is reached. For YOLOv2/v3, images are resized to
640×640 for both training and testing. For Faster RCNN detectors, the shortest
side of images is 2502 for training, and 800 for testing.
4.1 Evaluation of digital attacks
We begin by evaluating patches in digital simulated settings: we consider white-
box attacks (detector weights are used for patch learning) and black-box attacks
(patch is crafted on a surrogate model and tested on a victim model with different
parameters).
Effectiveness of learned patches for white-box attack. We optimize patches
using the aforementioned detectors, and denote the learned patch with the cor-
responding model it is trained on. We further compare with the following alter-
native patches: (1) Fted, a learned Yolov2 patch that is further fine-tuned on
a R50-FPN model; (2) Seurat, a crop from the famous paining “A Sunday Af-
ternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte” by Georges Seurat, which is visually
similar to the top-performing Yolov2 patch with objects like persons, umbrel-
las etc. (see Fig. 3k); (3) Grey, a grey patch; (4) Grey++, the most powerful
2 We found that using a lower resolution produced more effective attacks.
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(a) C4 (b) C4-r (c) FPN (d) FPN-r (e) Ens2 (f) Ens2-r (g) Ens3-r
(h) Fted (i) Yolov2 (j) Yolov3 (k) Seurat (l) Rand (m) G++ (n) Grey
Fig. 3: Adversarial patches, and comparisons with control patches. Here, (a)-
(d) are based on R50, and G++ denotes Grey++.
RGB value for attacking Yolov2 using COCO; (5) Random, a randomly initial-
ized patch; (6) Clean, which corresponds to the oracle performance of detectors
when patches are not applied.
Adversarial and control patches are shown in Fig. 3, and results are sum-
marized in Table 1. We observe that all adversarially learned patches are highly
effective in digital simulations, where the AP of all detectors degrades by at least
29%, going as low as 7.5% AP when the Yolov2 patch is tested on the retrained
Yolov2 model (YOLOv2-r). All patches transferred well to the corresponding
retrained models. In addition, the ensemble patches perform better compared to
Faster RCNN patches but are worse than YOLO patches. It is also interesting
to see that Yolo patches can be effectively transferred to Faster RCNN models,
while Faster RCNN patches are not very effective at attacking YOLO models.
Although the Seurat patch is visually similar to the learned Yolov2 patch
(cf. Fig. 3i and Fig. 3k), it does not consistently perform better than Grey. We
visualize the impact of the patch in Fig 4, which shows objectness maps from
the YOLOv2 model with and without patches. We see that when patches are
applied to persons, the corresponding pixels in the feature maps are suppressed.
Transferability across backbones. We also investigate whether the learned
patches transfer to detectors with different backbones. We evaluate the patches
on the following detectors: (1) R101-FPN, which uses ResNet-101 with FPN as
its backbone; (2) X101-FPN, replaces the R101-FPN with ResNeXt-101 [35];
(3)R50-FPN-m, a Mask RCNN model [12] based on R50-FPN; (4)X101-FPN-m,
a Mask RCNN model based on X101-FPN; (5)RetinaNet-R50, a RetinaNet [20]
with a backbone of ResNet-50; (6) FCOS, a recent anchor-free framework [32]
based on R50-FPN. The results are shown in Fig 5. We observe that all these
learned patches can significantly degrade the performance of the person category
even using models that they have not been trained on.
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Original Image
Patched Image
Feature Maps
Feature Maps
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
average precision
FCOS
RetinaNet-R50
X101-FPN-m
R50-FPN-m
X101-FPN
R101-FPN
Vi
ct
im
Patches
Clean
Grey++
Grey
Random
Seurat
Ens3-r
Ens2-r
Ens2
Fted
YOLOv3
YOLOv2
R50-FPN-r
R50-FPN
R50-C4-r
R50-C4
Fig. 4: Images and their feature
maps, w. and w/o patches, using
YOLOv2. Each pixel in the feature
map represents an objectness score.
Fig. 5: Performance of different
patches, when tested on detectors
with different backbones.
Patch
Class aero bike bird boat bottle bus car cat chair cow table dog horse mbike person plant sheep sofa train tv
Person 2.0 14.6 1.0 1.8 2.7 13.5 10.7 2.3 0.1 2.4 6.4 2.3 8.3 12.3 5.5 0.3 2.2 1.3 3.8 12.4
Horse 5.0 31.9 4.7 4.1 2.5 26.4 17.6 10.6 2.3 26.0 24.7 9.5 27.9 26.6 16.0 7.6 12.4 13.4 13.2 35.3
Bus 3.1 30.6 8.5 4.4 1.9 18.4 15.6 7.8 2.7 25.7 39.8 5.3 20.8 20.7 16.0 8.9 12.3 9.5 9.3 29.5
Grey 3.0 19.0 6.4 14.6 8.5 26.9 19.6 9.9 9.8 28.6 24.4 7.4 22.7 15.9 35.8 6.1 18.7 8.7 11.4 61.8
Clean 77.5 82.2 76.3 63.6 64.5 82.9 86.5 83.0 57.2 83.3 66.2 84.9 84.5 81.4 83.3 48.0 76.7 70.1 80.1 75.4
Table 2: Transferability of patches across classes from VOC, measured
with average precision (AP).
Transferability across datasets. We further demonstrate the transferability
of patches learned on COCO to other datasets including Pascal VOC 2007 [7]
and the Inria person dataset [6]. We evaluate the patches on the person category
using R50-FPN and R50-C4, and the results are presented in Fig. 6. The top two
panels correspond to results of different patches when evaluated on VOC and
Inria, respectively, with both the patches and the models trained on COCO; the
bottom panel shows the APs of these patches when applied to Inria images using
models trained on VOC. We see that ensemble patches offer the most effective
attacks, degrading the AP of the person class by large margins. This confirms
that these patches can transfer not only to different datasets but also backbones
trained with different data distributions. From the bottom two panels, we can
see that weights learned on COCO are more robust than on VOC.
Transferability across classes. We find that patches effectively suppress mul-
tiple classes, even when they are trained to suppress only one. In addition to the
“person” patch, we also train patches on “bus” and “horse,” and then evaluate
these patches on all 20 categories in VOC.3 Table 2 summarizes the results. We
can see that the “person” patch transfers to almost all categories, possibly be-
3 We observe similar trends on COCO.
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Fig. 6: Results of different patches, trained on COCO, tested on the
person category of different datasets. Top two panels: COCO patches tested
on VOC and Inria, respectively, using backbones learned on COCO; The bottom
panel: COCO patches tested on Inria with backbones trained on VOC.
cause they co-occur with most classes. We also compare with the Grey patch
to rule out the possibility that the performance drops are due to occlusion.
5 Physical world attacks
We now discuss the results of physical world attacks with printed posters. In
addition to the standard average precision,4 we also quantify the performance
of attacks with “success rates,” which we define as (1) a Success attack: when
there is no bounding box predicted for the person with adversarial patterns;
(2) a Partial success attack: when there is a bounding box covering less than
50% of a person; (3) a Failure attack: when the person is successfully detected.
Examples of detections in each category are shown in Fig. 7. To compute these
scores, we use cutoff zero for YOLOv2, and we tune the threshold of other
detectors to achieve the best F-1 score on the COCO minival set.
5.1 Printed posters
We printed posters and took photos at 15 different locations using 10 different
patches. At each location, we took four photos for each printed patch corre-
sponding to two distances from the camera and two heights where the patch is
4 We only consider the person with adversarially patterns to calculate AP by elimi-
nating boxes without any overlapping with the GT box.
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(a) Failure-p (b) Partial-p (c) Success-p
(d) Failure-c (e) Partial-c (f) Success-c
Fig. 7: Examples of attack failure, partial success, and full success, using
posters (top) and shirts (bottom).
held. We also took photos without printed posters as controls (Control). In
total, we collected 630 photos (see the top row of Figure 7 for examples). We
use four patches that perform well digitally (i.e., Yolov2, Ens2, Ens3, Fted),
and three baseline patches (Seurat patch, Flip patch, White).
To better understand the impact of the training process on attack power, we
also consider several variants of the Yolov2 patch (the best digital performer).
To assess whether the learned patterns are “truly” adversarial, or whether any
qualitatively similar pattern would work, we add the Flip patch, which is the
Yolov2 patch held upside-down. We compare to a TPS patch, which uses thin
plate spline transformations to potentially enhance robustness to warping in
real objects. We consider a Yolov2-noaug patch, which is trained to attack the
YOLOv2 model without any augmentations/transformations beyond resizing.
To observe the effect of the dataset, we add the Yolov2-Inria patch, which is
trained on the Inria dataset as opposed to COCO.
Poster results. Figure 8a and 8c summarize the results. We can see that com-
pared to baseline patches, Adversariallyy optimized patches successfully de-
grade the performance of detectors measured by both AP and success rates.
The Yolov2 patch achieves the best performance measured by AP among
all patches. R50-FPN is the most robust model with slight degradation when
patches are applied. FCOS is the most vulnerable network; it fell to the Yolov2
patch even though we never trained on an anchor-free detector, let alone FCOS.
This may be because anchor-free models predict the “center-ness” of pixels for
bounding boxes, and the performance drops when center pixels of persons are
occluded by printed posters. Interestingly though, simply using baseline patches
for occlusion fails to deceive FCOS.
Beyond the choice of detector, several other training factors impact perfor-
mance. Surprisingly, the TPS patch is worse than Yolov2, and we believe this
results from the fact that adding such complicated transformation makes op-
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Fig. 8: AP and success rates for physical attacks. Top: AP of different
printed posters (left) and clothes (right). Lower is better. Bottom: success rates
of different printed posters (left) and clothes (right). Y2 denotes Yolov2.
timization more difficult during training. It is also surprising to see that the
Yolov2-Inria patch offers impressive success rates on Yolov2, but it does not
transfer as well to other detectors. Not surprisingly, the Yolov2 patch out-
performs the Yolov2-noaug in terms of AP, however these gains shrink when
measured in terms of success rates.
We included the Flip patch to evaluate whether patches are generic, i.e.,
any texture with similar shapes and scales would defeat the detector, or whether
they are “truly adversarial.” The poor performance of the Flip patch seems to
indicate that the learned patches are exploiting specialized behaviors learned
by the detector, rather than a generic weakness of the detector model. From
the left column of Figure 8 and Table 1, we see that performance in digital
simulations correlates well with physical world performance. However, we observe
that patches lose effectiveness when transferring from the digital world into the
physical world, demonstrating that physical world attacks are more challenging.
5.2 Paper dolls
We found that a useful technique for crafting physical attacks was to make “paper
dolls”—printouts of images that we could dress up with different patches at
different scales. This facilitates quick experiments with physical world effects and
camera distortions without the time and expense of fabricating textiles. We use
paper dolls to gain insights into why physical attacks are not as effective as digital
attacks. The reasons might be three-fold: (1) Pixelation at the detector and
compression algorithms incur subtle changes; (2) the rendering artifacts around
patch borders assist digital attacks; (3) there exists differences in appearance
and texture between large-format digital patches and the digital patches.
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Fig. 9: Paper dolls are made by dressing up printed images with paper patches.
We use dolls to observe the effects of camera distortions, and “scrumpled”
patches to test against physical deformations that are not easily simulated.
In our paper doll study, we print out patches and photos separately. We then
overlay patches onto objects and photograph them. We used the first 20 images
from the COCO minival set. We use the same patches from the poster experi-
ment, we also compare with “scrumpled” versions of Yolov2, i.e., Yolov2-s1
and Yolov2-s2, to test for robustness to physical deformation, where “-s1” and
“-s2” denote the level of crumpling (“s1” < “s2”, see Fig. 9).
We compute success rates of different patches when tested with YOLOv2
and present the results in Fig. 10. Comparing across Fig. 10 and the left side
of Fig. 8, we see that paper dolls perform only slightly better than large-format
posters. The performance drop of paper dolls compared to digital simulations,
combined with the high fidelity of the paper printouts, leads us to believe that
the dominant factor in the performance difference between digital and physical
attacks can be attributed to the imaging process, like camera post-processing,
pixelation, and compression.
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Fig. 10: Effectiveness of different
patches on paper dolls.
(a) Y2-1 (b) Y2-2 (c) Y2-3 (d) Y2-4
(e) fted (f) Tps (g) E2-r (h) E3-r
Fig. 11: Adversarial shirts tested
in Section 6. Y2 denotes Yolov2.
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6 Wearable adversarial examples
Printed posters provide a controlled setting under which to test the real-world
transferability of adversarial attacks. However the success of printed posters does
not inform us about whether attacks can survive the complex deformations and
textures of real objects.
To experiment with complex real-world transfer, we printed adversarial pat-
terns on shirts using various strategies. We consider four versions of the Yolov2
patch representing two different scalings of the patch, both with and without
boundary reflections to cover the entire shirt (see Figure 11). We also consider
the TPS patch to see if complex data augmentation can help the attack survive
fabric deformations. Finally, we include the Fted, Ens2, Ens3 patches to see
if these more complex crafting methods facilitate transfer. We collected photos
of a person wearing these shirts at ten different locations. For each location and
shirt, we took 4 photos with two orientations (front and back) and two distances
from the camera. We also took control photos where the person was not wearing
an attack. We collected 360 photos in total (see Supple. for a gallery of samples).
We tested the collected images under the same settings as the poster study,
and measure the performance of the patches using both AP and success rates.
The results are shown in Fig. 8b and Fig. 8d. We can see that these wearable
attacks significantly degrade the performance of detectors. This effect is most
pronounced when measured in AP because, when persons are detected, they tend
to generate multiple fragmented boxes. It is also interesting to see that FCOS,
which is vulnerable to printed posters, is quite robust with wearable attacks,
possibly because shirts more closely resemble the clothing that appears in the
training set. When measured in success rates, sweatshirts with Yolov2 patterns
achieve ∼50% success rates, yet they do not transfer well to other detectors.
Among all Yolov2 shirts, smaller patterns (i.e., Yolov2-2) perform worse as
compared to larger patterns. We also found that tiling/reflecting a patch to
cover the whole shirt did not negatively impact performance, even though the
patch was not designed for this use. Finally, we found that augmenting attacks
with non-rigid TPS transforms did not improve transferability, and in fact was
detrimental. This seems to be a result of the difficulty of training a patch with
such transformations, as the patch also under-performs other patches digitally.
7 Conclusion
It is widely believed that fooling detectors is a much harder task than fool-
ing classifiers; the ensembling effect of thousands of distinct priors, combined
with complex texture, lighting, and measurement distortions in the real world,
makes detectors naturally robust. Despite these complexities, the experiments
conducted here show that digital attacks can indeed transfer between models,
classes, datasets, and also into the real world, although with less reliability than
attacks on simple classifiers.
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